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BOOK REVIEW
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND

HUMAN

RIGHTS.

By

Michael J. Perry.*
Reviewed by George E. Garvey**

Michael Perry's book, The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights,'
is an articulate and provocative defense of "extraconstitutional" judicial
decision-making in human rights cases. Professor Perry's strength is his
honesty: there is no attempt to support all human rights decisions by reference to the text, history or structure of the Constitution, nor are they justified as directly supportive of the processes of representative democratic
government. He is also courageous, speaking the language of religion
when his most sympathetic audiences are likely to recoil at the mention of
prophecy. That honesty and courage, however, expose a generally unspoken justification for the most extreme forms of judicial activism: the courts
speak with greater moral-not just legal-authority than do the representatives of the people.
The book is unlikely to convert non-believers and it may give pause to
some believers in an activist judiciary. It is a valuable addition to the literature regarding the propriety and limits of judicial review, however, because it offers a theoretic justification for decisions based on the newly
revived substantive due process.
Perry believes there are right answers to political moral questions and a
just society strives always to find those answers. Morality, he continues, is
evolutionary and the United States, as a basically religious nation,2 is funProfessor, Northwestern University School of Law.
Associate Professor, Cath. Univ. School of Law. B.A. 1969, Univ. of Illinois; J.D.
1972, Univ. of Wisc.
1. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
2. Perry states:
I want to emphasize, as strenuously as I can, that ... I use the word religious in its
etymological sense, to refer to a binding vision-a vision that serves as a source of
unalienated self-understanding, of "meaning" in the sense of existential orientation
or rootedness. I do not use the word in any sectarian,theistic, or otherwise metaphysical sense.
Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
*

**

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 33:801

damentally committed to continual moral growth. The people and their
elected representatives, however, tend to be wedded to conventional moral
norms and to resist moral evolution.3 Federal judges, since they are not
dependent on the people for tenure, are functionally best able to precipitate growth.
Perry views the role of the judiciary as prophetic: "it is to call the American people-actually the government, the representatives of the peopleto provisional judgment."4 To fulfill this prophetic role in human rights
cases, judges may look to their own consciences rather than to those
sources that an interpretivist would insist upon, e.g., the constitutional text
or the intent of the framers.
To reconcile this judicial role with the national commitment to representative democracy, Perry identifies the courts' role as part of a democratic
dialectic. The judiciary articulates a norm and the electorally responsible
branches react. The vehicle for reaction is Congress' power over the federal courts' jurisdiction. Congress, Perry suggests, can withdraw jurisdiction over those matters decided by the courts in their noninterpretive
capacity. Thus, ultimate power rests in the legislature and the democratic
ideal survives.
The Constitution, The Courts, and Human Rights reserves for a later essay the distinction between extra and contraconstitutional decisionmaking.5 It recognizes, however, that it may be contraconstitutional for the
judiciary to assume legislative powers. "[I]t is possible that enforcement,
by the federal judiciary against the governments of the fifty states, of value
judgments beyond those constitutionalized by the framers is itself a contraconstitutional practice-a practice contrary to the federal character of
American government established by the framers .... "' If, in fact, extraconstitutional policymaking is itself contraconstitutional 7 it would appear to be a threshhold issue that should not be reserved for later
development. From both a legal and moral perspective, the prospect of
the courts acting in a manner that violates the Constitution raises difficult,
if not insurmountable, issues for one attempting a functional justification
for judicial activism.
3. See id. at 100-01.
4. Id at 99.
5. Id. at ix.
6. Id.
7. The Constitution so clearly vests "[a]U legislative powers" in Congress, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 1, that Professor Perry should either establish that the type of judicial policymaking
he promotes is not legislative-an extraordinary task-or that the Constitution is not binding on the Court.
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Professor Perry reserves one other significant issue for later development. He asserts as a fundamental premise of his work that there are correct answers to moral questions but does "not pretend to defend the claim
that there are right answers. . . . However, the problem of objectivity in
ethics is a fundamental issue that constitutional theory cannot ignore if it
hopes to make a genuine intellectual advance." 8 These two issues left for
later treatment are not incidental to Professor Perry's theory; they are both
vital to the legitimacy of his analysis.
The book also insists upon an exceedingly rigid approach to interpretivism. The Constitution does not seem to embody values; it embodies the
value judgments of its framers. 9 The courts may not, consistent with interpretivism, invalidate a law if it appears that the framers of the Constitution
or its amendments would not have done so at the time of adoption. I will
not suggest a comprehensive interpretivist theory, but Perry's formulation
is not the only one that legal tradition or logic will allow.' °
There is a reason for the narrow formulation. Perry seeks to bring to all
noninterpretive review the legitimacy of Brown v. Board of Education."
Since the framers of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to eliminate
segregated schools, Perry argues, Brown was a noninterpretive decision. 2
Interpretivists, therefore, should either disavow Brown or accept the constitutional validity of all noninterpretive human rights cases. Brown and Roe
v. Wade, 3 for example, should be accepted or rejected together as a matter of constitutional theory, although Perry concedes that they need not
enjoy the same validity as a matter of policy or judgment. His case, however, is built on a narrow interpretivist model.
Professor Perry also minimizes the lessons of history. Activists are consistently met with a "what about Dred Scott 4 and Lochner?"' 5 argument.
Of course, it would be both foolish and dangerous to ignore the
relevant lessons of the past. . . . [However, our] evaluation of
noninterpretive review in human rights cases must be contextual,
which is to say that it must proceed principally by reference to
how such review has worked, can work, and is likely to work in
8. M. PERRY, supra note 1 at x.
9. Id. at 16, 70-72.
10. See H. READ, J. MACDONALD, J.
LATION 752-98 (4th ed. 1982).

FORDHAM & W. PIERCE, MATERIALS ON LEGIS-

11.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

12.
13.
14.
15.

M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 66-67.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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the modem period .... 16
The mistakes of the past are not particularly significant since modem
courts have made arguably sound value judgments.
Reliance on contemporary experience is risky, even for those who find
the modem courts' judgments sound. If Roe and Brown stand on the same
constitutional footing so also do Dred Scott and Lochner. It would follow
that those decisions were not constitutionally infirm; rather, they represented bad judgment. This formulation, however, provides no structural
or institutional restraints on future abuse. Restraint, and wisdom, must be
found within the judges while history cautions that the judiciary will not
be restrained.
I find the most problematic aspect of The Constitution, The Courts, and
Human Rights to be its assumption that courts are somehow skilled in
moral analysis. It is not self-evident to me that either legal education or
the judicial selection processes are likely to produce men and women with
superior moral judgment. If courts are in the business of making fundamental moral decisions free of the Constitution's text, structure and history, as well as the traditions of the people, I would suggest the need for
radical changes in the legal educational processes. 7
Professor Perry's justification for substantive due process demonstrates
the depth of the problem.
My own view is that noninterpretive review in most substantive due process cases, specifically those in which the judiciary
has sought to establish freedom of intimate association as a
human right, consists, in the main, of right answers to the questions the courts have addressed-answers approaching or perhaps even reaching an emergent point of convergence among a
variety of systematic moral theories. (This is not necessarily to
say that the judiciary has given answers to which there is a "consensus" among the American people. The moral sensibilities of
the pluralistic American polity typically lag behind, and are more
fragmented than, the developing insights of moral philosophy
and theology. A point of convergence among a variety of systematic moral theories, even if one exists or is emergent, does not
necessarily consist of an answer as to which there is a present
consensus among the people.)' 8
16. M.

PERRY, Supra note 1, at 116-17.
17. There seems to be little systematic exposure of law students to moral analysis. Professional responsibility courses focus on the relationship between attorneys and clients; matters such as the proper treatment of funds held in trust. They do not train lawyers to make
moral judgments for society.
18. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 118.
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Clearly he views the courts as searchers for the "developing insights of
moral philosophy and theology." Yet, I see little to suggest that judges are
by background skilled in the disciplines of systematic moral philosophy or
theology and nothing in the processes of adjudication is likely to bring
forth this needed expertise. Furthermore, judicial decisions seldom indicate that the courts have attempted a comprehensive moral analysis.
There are also, I believe, structural barriers to comprehensive moral
analysis by the judiciary. A decision based on a judge's conclusion that a
particular Roman Catholic, Protestant or other moral view is superior to
that of competing philosophies would likely shock the nation. The "wall
of separation" would be viewed as breached in a most egregious manner.
It should be no less shocking, however, for the courts to refuse to consider
the moral teachings of religious traditions when making moral value judgments. The constitutionalization of a secular moral philosophy, to the exclusion of traditional religious moral views, would be tantamount to
establishing a secular federal religion.
Experience also suggests to me that the judiciary is not an appropriate
vehicle for moral decisionmaking. History has shown the Court to be morally suspect: it fostered slavery "9and later racial separation, 20 and constitutionalized the right of employers to exploit children in the workplace. 2 '
Perry suggests that we must judge the Court by its contemporary decisions.
Although the judgment may not be as harsh, the contemporary judiciary
has not consistently demonstrated sound moral leadership.
From a moral perspective, Brown is perhaps the most compelling decision in the history of the Court. Roe, however, may be the Court's worst. I
cannot demonstrate that the delegation of the decision to have an abortion
to the woman is wrong; 22 but I have yet to see a compelling moral or legal
argument that the decision by the state to preserve the fetus is wrong. The
important point is that Roe presented one of the most profoundly important moral issues ever to reach the Court, ( a fetus is a human being, the
Court precipitated a moral catastrophe) and it did not deal with it as a
moral issue. Professor Perry's thesis is based on his belief that there are
right moral answers and that the courts will strive to find them. Roe, however, represents a dramatic effort to avoid a moral evaluation (apparently
splitting the difference between two strongly held views) while reaching a
conclusion with profound moral implications. The Court freed us from a
19. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
20. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
22. I am mindful that Roe actually delegated the abortion decision to physicians, at
least during the first trimester.
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conventional, anti-abortion norm but never explained why a society with
liberal abortion policies is a better society. It used the coercive powers of a
sovereign; not the persuasive force of prophecy.
This does not suggest that the Court should have reached a conclusion
about the morality of abortion. It rightly sensed that the issue would have
plunged it into a morass without the tools to climb out. One dramatic
claim to moral legitimacy in an abortion decision, for example, raises as
many moral questions as it resolves. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Beal v.
Doe2 3 stated "I am appalled at the ethical bankruptcy of those who preach
a 'right to life' that means, under present social policies, a bare existence in
utter misery for so many poor women and their children." 24 The rhetoric
is moving, but it leaves serious moral issues unresolved. Is non-existence
preferable to poverty, particularly poverty in the United States? Is Justice
Marshall embracing a materialistic moral philosophy, i.e., life lacking in
material benefits is worthless? How can a political body claiming moral
superiority not react aggressively to end "social policies [that result in] a
bare existence in utter misery?" Is a morality that celebrates all life ethically bankrupt?
I am not suggesting answers to these questions, but a body seeking to
assume a prophetic role must answer, or at least ask them. If the judiciary
is to serve as a moral leader, I believe it is essential that its reasoning and
motivation be articulated. Liberal abortion policies, for example, may be
the result of altruism,2 5 utilitarianism, 26 or even racism. 27 The underlying
motivation will determine over time if we are a moral nation, or one
steeped in immorality.
The need for explicit, systematic analysis, and fully articulated goals,
can perhaps best be seen in recent cases involving the rights of handicapped infants. 28 Treatment may be withheld, and a child allowed to die,
because (1) the treatment would only prolong the child's suffering; (2) the
child would survive but not enjoy all of the faculties of "normal" persons;
(3) the child would survive and impose substantial burdens on its family;
or (4) the child would survive as a ward of the state. Rhetorical incantations about the "quality of life," "privacy" or "parental autonomy" cannot
23. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
24. Id.at 456-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., id
26. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 355-56 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Commission to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1980).
27. Justice Blackmun, for example, noted in Roe that "population growth, pollution,
and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem." 410 U.S. at 116.
28. See, e.g., United States v. University Hosp., No. 83-6343 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 1984).

Book Review

19841

blink away the complexity of the moral issues. A society that does not
require the needless prolongation of the process of death may have a claim
to moral legitimacy. One that permits the termination of a life capable of
loving and being loved because it would burden others should have no
pretensions about being a moral "light to all the nations."'2 9
There are other examples of recent judicial developments that may be
legally sound, but difficult to justify on moral grounds. Upholding the
right of Nazis to demonstrate in a community with a large number of
death camp survivors may have been solid first amendment jurisprudence.3" It arguably fails to move this nation to a higher moral level than
a society that will not tolerate any propagation or demonstration of racial
hatred. An application of the exclusionary rule that places a demonstrably
violent person back into society is not without moral implications. Even
the courts' persistently deferential posture when reviewing state economic
regulations in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. ,31 may not be morally justified. In a society committed to a market economy--one which places a
stigma on those needing economic assistance-laws that limit access to the
market in order to benefit a powerful competing economic group raise serious moral concerns.
Even those areas identified by Professor Perry as in need of judicial
leadership have not frequently invoked desired responses.
In twentieth-century America, there have been several such issues: for example, distributive justice and the role of government, freedom of political dissent, racism and sexism, the death
penalty, human sexuality. Our electorally accountable policymaking institutions are not well suited to deal with such issues
in a way that is faithful to the notion of moral evolution or, therefore, to our religious understanding of ourselves. Those institutions, when finally they confront such issues at all, tend simply to
rely on established moral conventions and to refuse to see in such
issues occasions for moral reevaluation and possible moral
growth. That is not invariably the case, but sometimes, not infrequently, it is.32
In the area of distributive justice the courts have often either impaired
29. Beilah, Civil Religion in America 96 Daedalus 18 (1967), quotedin M. PERRY,

supra

note 1, at 98.
30. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 IUI. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978);
see Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, a'd,20 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d
836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961).
31. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).

32. M.

PERRY,

supra note 1, at 100.
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progress, 33 or refused to act.34 The battles against racism and sexism have
been effectively waged in the legislature,3 5 although the Court seems to
have functioned as a catalyst in Brown. The death penalty survives3 6 and
the Supreme Court has not been particularly progressive when dealing
with human sexuality.3 7 Only in the area of political dissent has the judiciary staked out a fairly unique protective role.
Chapter two of Perry's book attacks the judiciary's role as guardian of
the principles of federalism. The states, Perry believes, can take care of
themselves; federal legislators are elected by state constituencies and it is,
therefore, not functionally necessary for the courts to intervene on behalf
of the states.38
Federalism should not be so readily dismissed. It is not an abstract formality; federalism is functional.3 9 It accommodates diversity among the
several states. Federalism, rather than judicial activism, may best foster a
primary goal Perry seeks to achieve, a moral heterodoxy. Each state may
impose an orthodoxy, some demanding greater conformance to
majoritarian norms than others, but there is room for fifty orthodoxies.
And each individual enjoys a constitutional right to travel to and enjoy the
benefits of whatever state best comports with that person's concept of a just
society. 4°
Perry's formulation, on the other hand, results in a judicially imposed
federal orthodoxy. The value judgments of the federal judiciary are imposed on all states and extramajoritarian processes are required to escape
the judicial mandate. It may be, as Perry believes, that the states are able
to protect themselves against the actions of Congress. It is extraordinarily
difficult, however, for the states to protect themselves against the constitutional rulings of the federal courts.
If Professor Perry was dogmatic, The Constitution, The Courts, and
Human Rights could be dismissed as idiosyncratic. He is not, however,
33. See, e.g., Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
34. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
35. See H. HOROWITZ & K. KARST, LAW, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 352 (1969).
36. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
37. See Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83
(Summer 1980).
38. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 43-44.
39. J. BURNS & J. PELTASON, GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE, THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 87-89 (3d ed. 1957); see de Tocqueville, On Democracy in
America, in 1 THE PEOPLE SHALL JUDGE 522-24 (Phoenix ed. 1976); ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

105 (1969).
40. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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and the book offers a theory of judicial policymaking in human rights
cases. it is valuable because it subjects to scrutiny and discussion a premise that generally remains unstated; the judiciary can best bring about
moral growth because it is less responsible to the public. Those strongly
committed to aggressive judicial activism should recognize that justification must lie in a theory akin to Professor Perry's.
Since the concept of an enlightened judiciary, or perhaps more correctly
a less enlightened electorate, is intrinsically aristocratic, the proponent of a
theory that would establish the concept as part of our constitutional order
has a heavy burden of persuasion. There are, in my judgment, too many
missing pieces to Professor Perry's theory to satisfy this burden. Subt.heories essential to the validity of his model are reserved for later development or simply left undeveloped. Before accepting a model of judicial
review based on the judiciary's functional ability to provide moral leadership, I would want to be convinced that (1) this form of judicial policymaking does not itself violate the Constitution; (2) there is some
cognizable, workable model of ethical objectivity; and (3) the judiciary is
by training, selection or processes best able to make moral judgments. Until these issues have been adequately addressed, I would opt for moral
growth through experimentation and example among the states. Like
Perry, I am suspicious of a politically imposed moral orthodoxy; unlike
Professor Perry, however, I believe a salutary heterodoxy--one that permits moral reevaluation and growth--can best be fostered by a judicial
commitment to federalism and to policymaking by the electorally accountable branches of government.

